On April 16, JP Morgan/Chase Manhattan, the bank that recently worked with the Fed to acquire the former Bear Stearns investment bank, announced that they will not be making student loans to entering or continuing students enrolled at schools that have a poor repayment rate. Yet their spokesperson refused to mention the schools that would be affected by the announcement.
When I checked out comments on the Chronicle of Higher Education online, commentors speculated that the affected schools would be community colleges and for-profit colleges. They gave no reasons for their speculation, though I can offer one of my own: low graduation rates, meaning, that if students did not finish their education they were less likely to repay their student loans. I guess that government guarantees were not enough for Chase to continue lending to students at these schools. No surprise, they weren't good enough for Citibank 30 years ago during the Chrysler bailout.
I would understand the rationale of Chase's decision better if I knew which schools were on their list. Without seeing the list, I have to wonder if they have something to hide, such as a lending methodology. The last thing prospective borrowers need to hear is that a money center bank is "redlining" by providing more favorable loan terms to students who attend some schools over others. The very next things prospective borrowers should do, if their college-bound student is sincerely interested in a "redlined" school, is to look at other schools or cease doing any business with that bank.
Lending officers have no qualifications to make academic judgments about loan applicants or the academic qualities of a school. If university administrators fear the growing importance of media rankings, I can only imagine their fears if lenders determine the schools that will be their "haves" and "have nots."
Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings has assured schools and borrowers that there are still plenty of lenders who will make student loans as well as the capacity to expand direct lending, where the government acts as lender of last resort. But she should be concerned that Chase's decision will have a ripple effect on other lenders. Even with no comments from Chase, word will get out on the Internet from prospective borrowers and that word will spread to other financial institutions as well. It's difficult to say if other lenders will fill the void to offer loans, offer tougher terms or refuse to take the same risk with Chase's targeted schools.
If nothing else, Chase's decision has spurred a need for a new form of government intervention in the student loan markets: to publish an annual listing of "deadbeat" schools. There would be only one criterion for this list: a below-average repayment rate for government-supported student loans.
The federal government would make no judgment on the academic quality of the schools, nor their graduation and retention rates. This list would be made available to educators, parents, students and lenders so that each may make their own decisions. It's true that the government would be taking the lenders off the hook; the banks would not need to disclose lending practices to the public if the government becomes the published resource.
However, government would be doing all parties: educators, lenders and borrowers an important service. And the federal government has every right to use such a list as a means to collect their money.
(Originally published at Educated Quest blog and reprinted with permission of the author, Stuart Nachbar).
I had pointed out that Chase's spokesperson refused to list the affected schools, but that borrowers deserved to know. I also added that such information would end up becoming public anyway, as unhappy borrowers would eventually post it on the Internet. Finally, I stated that the government should provide borrowers, educators and lenders with a list of schools that have below average default rates.
This morning, the reader told me that the U.S Department of Education (DOE) already publishes such a list and it is available to the public. So, I went to their site to take a look. One thing I learned was that you needed to know their terminology in order to find the list. It took some digging to find.
I appreciate the reader pointing this out, because I learned more than I expected. The DOE tracks cohort default rates. A cohort default rate, according to a PDF guide posted on the site, is based on a fraction: the number of borrowers who have defaulted on students over the past two fiscal years divided by the number of borrowers who begin to repay their loans over the past fiscal year. A cohort year is the same as a federal fiscal year, October 1 through September 30.
According to the DOE, A school is subject to sanctions, meaning the loss of Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL), Federal Direct Loan (DL), and/or Federal Pell Grant Program eligibility if the school has three consecutive official cohort default rates that are 25 percent or greater. Also, a school is subject to the loss of FFEL and DL Program eligibility if the school has an official cohort default rate that is greater than 40 percent for the most recent cohort year. The Web site also reported that no school had fallen under these sanctions since FY 2005.
And there is some good news: the national cohort default rate has dropped from a high of 22.4% in 1990 to 4.6 percent in 2005, the last year that the DOE has available data. Cohort default rates ranged from 4.5 percent to 5.4 percent between 2001 and 2005. That means that someone has done a better job of collecting the money from borrowers.
While I can't draw firm conclusions from limited research, I have to believe that private lenders use their own methodology to decide who qualifies for a student loan, as well as the DOE statistics. A 4.6 percent default rate, along with government guarantees and subsidies suggests that student loans are not a risky business, though it is possible collection expenses and subsidized origination fees ? charged to students in direct lending - cut into their profits. Even then, some lenders chose to make gifts to financial aid officers to direct students their way. I'd have to guess that the profitability of student loans for the gift-giving lenders depended on receiving preferential treatment.
But my digging takes me back to my original question: how does Chase, or any other lender, choose the "haves" and "have nots?"
According to the DOE Web site, for example, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Tribally Controlled Community Colleges (TCCs), and Navajo Community Colleges, as defined by statute, have been eligible for relief from the consequences of cohort default rates. As of September 2007, all 98 eligible HBCUs had official FY 2005 cohort default rates that fell below regulatory thresholds. No HBCUs are subject to cohort default rate sanctions.
While the federal government has provided relief, I must ask another question: How have the banks treated borrowers from these schools and others? I welcome any reader to answer.
(Originally published at Educated Quest blog and reprinted with permission of the author, Stuart Nachbar).
Stuart Nachbar has sinced written about articles on various topics from Education, Presidential Election Results and Education. Stuart Nachbar has been involved with education politics, policy and technology as a student, urban planner, government affairs manager, software executive, and now as author of The Sex Ed Chronicles. Visit his blog,. Stuart Nachbar's top article generates over 9900 views. to your Favourites.