Broadly speaking, antitrust laws seek to promote fair competition on the merits and to protect consumers and businesses from anti-competitive business practices. The antitrust laws therefore forbid the wrongful acquisition of monopoly power, the abuse of monopoly power even if it was properly acquired in the first place, and other business practices that improperly stifle or suppress free competition.
The Antitrust Statutes
The antitrust laws are codified into various statutes, the most important of which is the Sherman Act, which is a federal law that provides civil remedies and criminal penalties for the principal antitrust violations -- improper monopolization, abuse of monopoly power, and conspiracies to restrain trade. The Sherman Act is worded in broad, open-ended language so that clever competitors cannot elude its provisions by lawyerly evasions and obfuscation.
The Clayton Act is another federal statute, which imposes restrictions on proposed mergers, acquisitions, and other fusions, and which also serves as a supplement to the Sherman Act, providing an enumeration of specific practices that are anticompetitive and therefore forbidden. It usefully allows the courts to enjoin anti-competitive conduct before it actually causes harm. The Robinson-Patman Act, which is also a federal statute, prohibits specific business practices such as price-fixing, and does so in technical, specific language that makes it the very reverse of the Sherman Act. It serves as a supplement to both the Sherman and Clayton Acts and is sometimes invoked by civil litigants who have also brought claims under the other two Acts.
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted during the Great Depression to offer protection to struggling small businesses. It is increasingly viewed by experts as anachronistic and problematic because of its overly technical requirements. Its prohibition against price-fixing, however, remains useful to private litigants.
The Federal Trade Commission Act, yet another federal statute, established the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which has regulatory authority to enforce the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act. The FTC arguably has authority that exceeds the foregoing Acts and allows it to test the limits of antitrust policy (Section 5 of the FTC Act gives it enormous discretion).
In addition to these federal statutes, each state in the Union has its own antitrust statutes that forbid unfair competition in intrastate commerce. The state statutes tend to be modeled after the Sherman Act, which is the foremost and premier article of antitrust legislation.
The Courts and Antitrust Theory
Since the antitrust statutes are couched in general language (e.g. "it is an offense to conspire to restrain trade"), they have no practical meaning until the courts actually enforce them against the businesses accused of violating them. It is therefore impossible to understand antitrust law merely by reading the applicable statutes. It is necessary to know the cases as well as their underlying reasoning, and it is helpful to understand antitrust theory, which is elaborated and debated by economists and law professors across the country, and which is often referred to expressly in the cases.
Why Antitrust Law Matters
Antitrust law matters to consumers and businesses that have been either harmed by anti-competitive abuses or accused of employing them.
An antitrust offender sued in civil court risks paying treble damages (three times the value of proven harm caused by its offense), as well attorney's fees and costs, which include high fees for expensive experts. The alleged offender might also be ordered to curtail certain business practices during the lawsuit, then ordered to do so permanently if the suspended practices are deemed at trial to be antitrust violations. This is usually costly to the alleged offender, who must abruptly change its way of doing business while forfeiting a profitable commercial practice, and at the same time it suffers hurtful bad press (e.g., "Microsoft was today ordered to stop bundling its internet browser with its Windows operating system, since this practice will likely be shown to be harmful and unfair to purchasers of computing equipment").
In really egregious cases, the alleged offender might find itself the subject of a criminal prosecution, and its officers and directors may be personally indicted, tried, and convicted. Criminal prosecutions of antitrust law are done by the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), as well as by state prosecutors. The FTC, as noted above, has strong regulatory powers and can readily refer matters to the DOJ or act in concert with it.
If a criminal conviction is obtained, jail is possible for directors and officers, steep fines are certain, and a ruinous succession of civil cases from competitors and customers becomes inevitable. In most but not all cases, a criminal conviction for antitrust violations foretells the demise of the company that receives it. Criminal prosecutions tend to be undertaken only where the wrongdoing is either brazen or outrageous, or where the harm caused by the wrongdoing is exceptional. Much depends also on the political climate (e.g., during the Reagan-Bush years there were far fewer criminal prosecutions than there have been since President Clinton took office).
Antitrust Offenses
What exactly are antitrust offenses? It might be said that an antitrust offense is a tort committed against a market rather than against a particular business or person in the market. The classic antitrust offenses are (1) the obtaining of monopoly power by improper means, (2) the preservation or enlargement of monopoly power by improper means, (3) the abuse of monopoly power in one market to obtain a competitive advantage in another market, and (4) conspiring to suppress or stifle competition by unfair practices (restraints of trade).
A monopoly is not necessarily evil, nor by its mere existence does it violate antitrust laws. Monopolies are deemed necessary or even useful in some markets: For example, it was thought until recently that electrical power could be best furnished by local monopolies, none of whom ever competed against the others (this circumstance finally might change because of recent developments in the relevant technologies).
Nevertheless, it is always a violation of antitrust law to use unfair means to acquire monopoly power in a particular market, or to use unfair methods to preserve or enlarge monopoly power, and or to abuse monopoly power in one market to obtain a competitive advantage in another market. This is the bread and butter of antitrust law.
Moreover, two competitors in a particular marketplace cannot usually merge together or otherwise have a fusion of their businesses if by the fusion they acquire either monopoly power or an overly dominant position that is deemed harmful to consumers. The question is typically decided by the FTC, to which the would-be business couple applies for approval in advance of the merger or acquisition.
Antitrust laws also forbid commercial conspiracies whose purpose is to impose improper restraints on trade. For example, competitors may not agree to fix the prices that they charge for their goods or service, nor may they pre-arrange a bidding process for a particular contract, nor may they gerrymander the market for their wares. There are many other such practices which, if undertaken by two or more entities, are deemed to be unacceptable restraints upon trade, for which civil and sometimes criminal penalties are deemed appropriate.
The Origins of Antitrust Law, Briefly Stated
Antitrust law makes more sense if you have some understanding of its origins. What, for example, does "antitrust" mean? As with everything else, it all makes much more sense if you understand the first principles.
Although many people are broadly familiar with "antitrust law" and "antitrust lawsuits", few understand the origins of the law or even of the term "antitrust".
It all goes back to the so-called robber barons of the late 1800s, who amassed staggering wealth and business power in the related industries of petroleum production, steel production, banking, and railroad transport. We speak here of the Rockefellers, the Harrimans, Andrew Carnegie, the Mellon family, the Pierponts, the DuPonts, the financier Morgan, and a handful of others, who came to dominate the great industries that were transforming the United States from a remote post-colonial economy to the leading industrial and commercial power. Whether they attained their success by luck, or by superior talent, or by unfair predatory machinations, is a matter that remains debated to this day.
If these robber barons, as they came to be called, helped to transform and greatly improve our economy, they also acquired so much wealth and power that millions of their countrymen became envious, resentful, and distrustful of them. The robber barons owned too much, consumed too conspicuously, and wielded too much influence.
There arose a populist movement against the robber barons, while respectable thinkers opined that the extreme and increasing concentration of wealth and power would transform us not only from a remote backwater into a world-class power, but also from a nation of farmer-merchants to one of magnates, underlings, and indefensible inequalities.
The robber barons had cleverly shielded their fortunes and business empires in carefully arranged "trusts", or at least they tried to do so. Those who decried their undue power became known as "trustbusters", who advocated the elaboration of "antitrust laws". William Jennings Bryan was one such person. President Benjamin Harrison was another, but he was replaced by William McKinley at the turn of the century.
The most successful proponent of antitrust laws was an affluent blueblood himself, Mr. Teddy Roosevelt, who became President when McKinley was shot in 1901 at Buffalo. Roosevelt was re-elected in his own right thereafter, and was nearly elected again when he formed his own party, the Bull Moose Party, to challenge the pro-big business faction in his Republican Party, which he quit in protest before the elections of 1912.
When Roosevelt became President, the Sherman Act had already been enacted, but was moribund and largely or entirely ignored by businesses and regulatory authorities. Roosevelt breathed life into the statute, which during his tenure was finally used to break up the old trusts and prevent their further encroachment on the commerce and public life of the country.
Roosevelt was not a "liberal" as the term is used in today's politics, but he was a "radical" who advocated abrupt, deep change to the way business and politics were done: Ever the champion of fair play, he resolved to bring down the trusts and restore equity in the markets. He became the de facto champion of the antitrust movement, which enjoyed broad support until the outbreak of the Great War in Europe, when all the sudden Americans found that they actually wanted all-powerful industrialists who could protect us from our old-world rivals.
But antitrust fervor has come and gone in cycles ever since and has been part of our political and business landscape ever since Teddy Roosevelt took up the cause of fair play in the marketplace.
Fair play and a level playing field -- these were the aims of antitrust law, though not always the result. This is all Roosevelt wanted -- that every business have a fair chance at succeeding, without being trampled upon by a dominant competitor who could ruin its chances before it had a shot at success.
The great antitrust statutes set out to promote this purpose, and they were therefore worded in remarkably open-ended language, so as to anticipate the sophistication and cunning of the trustmasters, who, if given the tiniest loophole, would exploit it perfectly.
The Inescapable Injustice of Antitrust Law
The courts have tried for nearly a century to give meaning to the broad standards enunciated in the principal antitrust statutes, and not surprisingly they have often contradicted one another in their rulings: Some courts have been disposed to find antitrust violations in every corner, while others have refused to see it in even the most brazen instances of commercial impropriety. It sometimes seems as though the many decisions, if considered as a whole, appear to be an unwieldy, incoherent hodge-podge of ad hoc improvisations that hopelessly contradict one another, if not in specific outcomes then in their underlying reasoning.
If laws should be generally understood in advance by the population whom they are supposed to govern, then the antitrust laws have largely been a failure, since their meaning and practical effect become clear only after the courts develop specific applications of the broad standards given in the underlying statutes -- which they do only when called upon by an aggrieved private litigant or a government prosecutor.
Thus one competitor might object to the business practices of its more successful rival. It then brings an antitrust suit, or complains about the matter to the DOJ. A civil antitrust case is brought, or, in some instances, a criminal proceeding is initiated. The court, having been thus summoned, now decides whether or not there has been an antitrust violation -- and this it does by applying the general formulas of the statutes to the specific business practices under challenge. Whether or not the practice is improper becomes known only after the court has ruled. This is inevitably followed by appeals made by the losing party, and then by further appeal. The entire process can last for years. This is a very curious brand of law, and one that appears to fail the first test of all laws: Is it generally understood to forbid certain conduct in advance of the fact, or is its application unpredictable, unknowable, seemingly arbitrary, and therefore disruptive?
The Injustice Is Necessary
But it is impossible to foresee every sort of business arrangement that might constitute an unfair practice that impedes the marketplace, and it is therefore impossible to enumerate the forbidden practices. Thus the antitrust laws limit themselves to the statement of general principles, and leave to the courts and regulatory authorities the difficult task of applying these principles to contested business practices. In effect, the antitrust statutes are a "constitution of the marketplace", setting forth the broad principles of how markets should operate. The civil and criminal penalties, including the onerous burden of treble damages, seem necessary because they deter anticompetitive behavior, and also because they give strong incentive to victims to come forward to complain of antitrust misconduct.
Antitrust Law And Economics
The antitrust laws are supposed to promote and protect competition. This alone is their proper purpose. They are not intended to punish big companies merely on account of their size, nor to serve as surrogate "consumer protection" laws. Most importantly, they have never been anti-market or anti-business in their underlying conception or in their implementation. On the contrary, the antitrust laws are intended to promote market economics and healthy competition in every market, while checking the abuses that sometimes arise in different markets.
The idea behind these laws is that in every market there should be robust competition: If in each market there are many sellers busily competing against one another to sell a particular kind of product or service to paying customers, no one seller will be able to take unfair advantage of the buyers, but rather each seller will be obliged to offer its good or service on attractive terms, and each seller will be responsive and efficient in its dealings with buyers, who otherwise will simply turn to another, better seller.
In other words, vigorous competition in any given market keeps the sellers honest, forcing them to strive continually both to improve their goods and services and to offer them on favorable terms. Customers benefit from this competition. Poorly run companies are run out of business, as they deserve to be. The better run companies, and the most honest ones too, tend to prosper. Society as a whole benefits.
This is nothing other than the glory of marketplace economics working properly and rewarding each of us for our efforts, our talent, and our perseverance. The antitrust laws exist to help marketplace economics to work better.
The Origins of the Antitrust Law
American antitrust laws were intended to break up the enormous family "trusts" that in the late 1800s came to dominate banking, oil production, rail transport, shipping, steel production and a handful of other key industries in the United States.
Many Americans resented the enormous accumulation of power and wealth that this handful of families acquired from their dominance of these key markets, and others grew alarmed that these dominant firms would abuse their market power in order to exact unfair advantages from their customers, doing so precisely because they had eliminated their rivals and now had unchecked power in the different markets that they totally controlled.
Anti-Business or Pro-Competition?
This is where the confusion arises. The antitrust laws were never intended to indulge the clamorings of anti-business populists, such as William Jennings Bryan or his socialist fellow travelers in Europe. To such populists, it was unfair that these industrial barons should have so much affluence and power, while millions of other labored in misery for a pittance, without any social protection or any prospect of improving their sorry lot in a cruel world.
The antitrust laws, although enacted to redress the abuses imposed or threatened by the great trusts, were never intended to accomplish the anti-business, anti-market purposes of the turn-of-the-century populists. Both the populists and the antitrust laws decried the same abuses done by the same trusts, but each had very different purposes in mind.
For the antitrust laws serve to promote and protect market economics, doing so on the theory that society flourishes the most when it is founded on vigorous competition: According to this theory, competition brings forth the best in each of us, keeping each of us on our toes, mindful that if we do not perform well, we will be cast aside for someone else who can perform better. It is a harsh logic, and it works very well because it rightly understands and anticipates actual human nature and human psychology in action.
Promoting competition as an end in itself might be harsh economic policy, but it works better than all the others because it is based on an accurate understanding of what motivates human beings most the time in most their dealings with one another. To paraphrase Adam Smith, the baker does not ask himself whether you might wish to enjoy some of his excellent bread this evening with your meal. No, he wants you to give him money, and thus he strives to make excellent bread so that you will be persuaded to purchase your bread from him and not from some other baker.
The populist, in contrast, expects each of us to be selfless and altruistic, asking ourselves, "what is best for our society as a whole?", and "how can society aid those who are ailing?" He then expects the general population to make sacrifices to give effect to these wonderful, ambitious sentiments. These sacrifices usually come in the form of onerous taxes, which are paid to the government, which uses them in theory to provide social services to the needy and for other worthy social causes.
But this populist approach to inequality and misery, however well-meaning in theory, seems rarely to work in practice: Human beings seem above all to be motivated by selfish behavior, at least in their dealings with strangers. A mother might well love her children so dearly that she will walk through a wall of fire at mortal risk to herself to save one of them from the flames. But when she goes to market to buy her bread for her family, she wants the best bread at the lowest price, and the baker and his family can go to the devil if he cannot provide this for her. (The author of this article would argue that there are certain public services that the government alone is best placed to provide, but that the role of government must always be sensibly limited, and that each of us must be kept constantly on our toes by the demands of marketplace economics.
The antitrust laws exist not to help populist business-bashers dismantle successful, prosperous companies, even the most dominant global monopolies of the era. Rather, these laws are meant to redress or temper the fundamental flaw that seems inherent to unbridled competition. A word of explanation is in order. Competition is the best market system for human beings, so the theory goes, because each of us goes to market to do selfish bidding for ourselves and our families. We will produce the best goods and services, doing so at the best prices, only because if we fail to do so our customers will abandon us and buy from another; and when we ourselves buy goods or services, we will look to the seller who can provide them on the most favorable terms, taking into account considerations of quality, price, and delivery, etc. Thus antitrust laws promote market economics and are never to be confused with antimarket economics. Antitrust laws do not punish big businesses merely because they are big and successful. Success rather is the proper reward to those who labor well or who provide excellent goods and services to their customers. This is what motivates us in the first place to do well. Success must be encouraged, not envied or resented, much less punished by government confiscation (i.e., taxation and redistributive policies).
The Besetting Flaw of Market Economics
Rather than punish successful firms or proscribe free markets, as the populists seem to want, the antitrust laws seek instead to perfect the markets by "correcting" the inherent contradiction of market economies, which is as follows: In many key markets, one firm or a clutch of major firms often come to dominate the entire market. Once this happens, competition in this market ceases altogether or at best becomes a pale shadow of its former self. If, say, one company alone sells computer operating software for nearly all personal computers, the users of personal computer find themselves too much at its mercy and too vulnerable to its depredations. The dominant company might well have become dominant because it makes a better or less expensive product or has been more astute at spotting and exploiting commercial opportunities. But once this firm becomes the only competitor, it will no longer be kept on its toes by the threat of superior competition. It will find that "it is the only show in town", and it will naturally look for ways to exact bigger profits and more onerous concessions from its captive customers. The law of tendencies makes clear that it is only a matter of time before the dominant firm abuses its customers. Over time the market controlled by a single firm or handful of firms will no longer enjoy the expected, ordinary benefits of robust competition – competitive pricing, quality in production, superior service, and constant, impatient innovation.
The antitrust laws serve to check and redress the abuse of market dominance. It punishes (1) those who acquire market dominance by improper means, and (2) those who, having acquired market dominance by proper means, have abused it since obtaining it. It also punishes the conspiracies, both express and tacit, that powerful firms sometimes try to impose across entire markets in order to consolidate market power and exact unfair benefits. These are the true purposes of the antitrust laws.
Put another way, the antitrust laws presuppose that unrestrained market competition is the best method of promoting lasting prosperity and wealth for the greatest number. But unrestrained competition, put into practice, often leads to the emergence of stultifying monopolies and oligopolies that take unfair advantage of their customers while hindering innovation and commercial excellence. This is the great and eternal contradiction of market economics, and it is this contradiction that the antitrust laws seek to redress.
It is a difficult task precisely because it arises from a fundamental contradiction: Markets should be left alone and left to regulate themselves, save when a market becomes corrupted by a predatory monopoly or is harmed by predatory trade impositions – both of which seem inevitably to occur in unregulated markets of certain kinds. The underlying logic of the antitrust laws would seem to arise from this very contradiction, and can be summarized as follows: Leave the markets alone, knowing that in time the winners will abuse their victorious position, and then regulate or punish the victors; and always punish those who collude to impose trading shams. The antitrust laws should serve to regulate or punish the offending monopoly or trade practices.
What Antitrust Laws Try to Accomplish
Antitrust laws, properly understood, are intended to grapple with this market contradiction. In particular they forbid any improper monopoly or any attempt to obtain a monopoly by improper means (i.e., a monopoly obtained or attempted by a firm that on purpose has destroyed or tried to destroy its competitors, using anticompetitive tactics whose sole purpose has been to undermine competitor businesses). These laws also forbid dominant firms to act in collusion in order to impose unfair commercial practices that impose upon any market that they dominate or aim to dominate by means of the improper practice, and they also outlaw various kinds of recognized commercial fraud that are always deemed to be so anti-competitive as to be per se unlawful (i.e., bid-rigging, price-fixing, etc.).
The Charter Principles of Antitrust Law
The antitrust laws strive to set forth a series of general propositions that serve as the "charter principles" of marketplace economics in the United States. I think these charter principles and their corollaries can be summarized as follows: It is always improper to acquire monopoly power by means of business practices whose only purpose is to undermine or destroy business rivals. If your computer software is so good or so inexpensive that everyone buys only from you, then you have won in the marketplace and have obtained a proper monopoly. If you use business methods calculated to crush rival makers of software, and if by such methods you acquire or perpetuate your monopoly, you have committed an antitrust offense. It is also improper to attempt to acquire a monopoly by means of such predatory or anti-competitive business practices, and it is likewise improper to conspire with others to try to do so or to succeed at doing so. Any such effort constitutes an antitrust offense. It is likewise improper for two or more firms to act in concert or conspire in order to impose predatory or anti-competitive schemes in a market in which they jointly wield significant power or control. The litany of such abuses is as long as the imagination of the wily managers of the bigger firms in each market. But any time two or more firms collude to impose unfair trade restraints in a market that they control, their effort constitutes an antitrust offense, or least arguably constitutes such an offense. It is always improper for two or more ostensible competitors to agree in secret to set prices (price-fixing), pre-arrange competitive bids (bid-rigging), divvy up customers in a market by pre-arrangement (horizontal market allocation), or provide a necessary product or service only on condition that the buyers also purchase another product or service (unlawful tying). Any such practice, however ingeniously characterized, is an antitrust offense if it is detected and proven. There are other, more technical wrongs that likewise constitute antitrust offenses: For example, it is an antitrust offense for two firms to agree to an exclusive supplier or exclusive dealer arrangement, if the arrangement unreasonably harms competition or tends to give rise to a monopoly. It is sometimes improper for two competitors, however honest, to merge or otherwise unite, if by so doing they significantly diminish competition in markets in which they have been competitors. A proposed merger or acquisition, if it is large enough, must therefore usually obtain advance clearance from antitrust authorities, such as the Federal Trade Commission (this is another topic, fit for a book or volumes of books all on its own). These then would be the grand principles of the marketplace enshrined in the antitrust laws that have served us so well for more than a century.