Mortgage originators - those companies that help start mortgages and transactions - rarely keep the mortgages they start. Many mortgages are sold to secondary markets because the originators want to take the fees they collected and keep mortgage debts off of their books.
These new mortgages usually become part of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), asset-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations markets.
This article will look at how securities firms uses new mortgages to structure their securities, as well as the performance assumptions for those securities and how the yield requirements affect interest rates and credit terms available to consumers.
From Originator to Investor
Small originators often sell their mortgages to large originators. Those companies pool mortgages together and make them secure as mortgage-backed securities through Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or other private-label securities.
The mortgage-backed securities then are sold to securities dealers, who sell them or use them as collateral in finance securities. Those securities are sold to investors. Many of these mortgage-backed securities will be in structured securities, which also are known as structured finance deals.
The Payment Waterfall Structure of CMOs, ABSs, and CDOs
Payment waterfalls can take a pool of mortgages with lower credit characteristics and make tranches within a deal with higher credit ratings.
A "tranche" describes a specific class of bonds within another finance deal. One way to think of the tranche is to think of a security within a security. Many structured deals may have several tranches. Tranches are designed to have a certain credit rating and certain performance characteristics. Some tranches have higher ratings than the pool of mortgages, and others have lower ratings.
In a typical CMO deal, for example, tranches with higher ratings receive priority over tranches with lower ratings. Lower tranches will absorb payment defaults and higher tranches will be unaffected. Specific rules in the waterfall determine the order in which each tranche will take the losses.
Usually about 80 percent of the tranches in a structured deal will have a higher credit rating than the underlying pool. The other 20 percent tranches are of equal or lower rating.
The Demand for Yield, Complex Models, and Pricing Signals
Different tranches are priced based on their credit ratings and the yield that investors demand.
Dealers and investors use complex models to track the performances of the different tranches with various interest rates and economic environments. These models are important to investors who want to determine the yield where a particular tranche in a structured finance deal could be bought. In turn, that yield is an important pricing signal for credit terms and mortgage rates. That signal is passed from securities dealers to aggregators; the aggregators pass that on to originators. This information directly affects the interest rates and credit terms that customers can be offered.
This is important to understanding how structured finance deals affect the interest rates and mortgage terms that consumers may be offered. If the complex model's assumptions about defaults is correct, the lower priority tranches will protect higher priority tranches. This means that everything in the so-called "mortgage machine" will run smoothly. If model is inaccurate, however, there are several things that could happen in the market.
1. Losses will move up the waterfall structure of certain deals. Tranches with higher credit ratings will start to absorb losses.
2. Investors will demand more yield as the securities' credit ratings drop.
3. Securities dealers will lower their bid prices for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.
4. Mortgage originators will raise interest rates and tighten credit terms to try to protect their profit margins.
The finance market is smart and covers the profits, consumers may think they are taking advantage of companies when they sign up for a low APR , they've run the numbers and no they will profit in the long run.
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities
With 2008 having been an election year, it has been convenient to levy all blame for our country's current economic condition on our nation's presidential administration for the last eight years. However, a significant portion of the fiscal woes now plaguing both Wall Street and Main Street originated well before the current administration ever set foot in the White House. In fact, it was in 1999 that the previous administration openly urged the Federal National Mortgage Association (aka ?Fannie Mae?) to reduce down payment and credit requirements for sub-prime or ?at risk? borrowers in what appeared to be a valiant attempt to increase home ownership rates among minorities and low-income consumers.
In an amazingly prophetic article written by Steven A. Holmes of The New York Times when Fannie Mae began purchasing sub-prime mortgages in 1999, Mr. Holmes explained that ?Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic times. But . . . may run into trouble in an economic downturn prompting a government rescue.? Holmes further explained ?If they fail, the government will have to step up and bail them out.?
Once the housing bubble began to burst in 2005 and 2006, home prices started declining and by late 2007 the United States? economy as a whole began to decline. With so much attention directed at slumping housing and stock values, it is easy to forget that this fiscal contraction began with the sub-prime mortgage crisis that has since turned Wall Street into a house of cards that seems to shed portions of its structure each week. By 2008, both of the government sponsored enterprises (?GSE?) known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ultimately failed and were eventually rescued by the Federal Government as predicted.
Even enormous public investment houses and banks like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, A.I.G., Washington Mutual and Wachovia have all required government intervention that has cost tax payers hundreds of billions of dollars to date. Despite continuous public outcries condemning the ?Wall Street Fat Cats?, it is difficult to blame these failed public corporations that either originated these sub-prime mortgages that conformed to GSE requirements or purchased or insured supposedly sound mortgage-backed securities from the GSEs.
Specifically, banks like Washington Mutual and Wachovia originated loans to sub-prime borrowers according to GSE conforming loan requirements before selling these mortgages on the secondary loan market to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers then assisted the GSEs by pooling these mortgages together to attempt to diversify risk, thereby creating collateralized debt obligations called mortgage-backed securities that were sold to institutional investors. Companies like A.I.G. provided credit-default swaps (?CDS?) that acted like insurance for institutional investors that purchased the mortgage-backed securities to protect them from defaults by the original borrowers.
It is critical to remember that before the sub-prime loan defaults escalated far beyond generally anticipated levels that caused the house of cards to start falling, the companies originating, purchasing and insuring these loans and securities were operating under the assumption that they were working with relatively safe loans that conformed to the requirements of government sponsored entities. It is unfortunate that it was these very requirements that had been relaxed in 1999, which in turn formed the unstable foundation upon which all of the cards ultimately fell.
Both Landon Mcgehee & Brian S. Icenhower are contributors for EditorialToday. The above articles have been edited for relevancy and timeliness. All write-ups, reviews, tips and guides published by EditorialToday.com and its partners or affiliates are for informational purposes only. They should not be used for any legal or any other type of advice. We do not endorse any author, contributor, writer or article posted by our team.
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Brian S. Icenhower has sinced written about articles on various topics from Real Estate, Fannie and Freddie Mae and Real Estate. Brian S. Icenhower, Esq., BS, JD, CRB, CRS, ABR is a broker, attorney, , prosecution consultant for district attorney real estate fraud. Brian S. Icenhower's top article generates over 33100 views. to your Favourites.
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